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hibiiion : Herbert v. Easton, 43 Ala. 547; 11iltiants v. Haines, 27
Iowa 251; -utland v. Copes, 15 Rich. 84; Kirtland v. J1.olton,
41 Ala. 548. But on the other hand, where a mortgage contained
a power to the creditor to sell on breach of condition, it was held
that a subsequent law giving the mortgagor twelve months to redeem
the property from the purchaser at such sale, so altered the remedy
of the creditor as to impair-the obligation of the contract- TANEY,
C. J., said: " If such rights may be added to the original contract
by-subsequent legislation, it would be difficult to say at what point
they must stop. An equitable interest in the premises may, in like
manner, be conferred upon others ; and the right to redeem may be
so prolonged as to deprive the mortgagee of the benefit of his security, byrendering the property unsalable for anything like its value:"
R6ronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311 ; Howard v. Bugbee,24 Id. 461;
Talony v. Fortune, 14 rowa 417. And again, a state law forbidding_ property levied on execution to be sold for less than two-thirds
of its_ appraised value, so far obstructs the remedy as to impair the
obligation of the contract, and cannot apply to debts accrued before
its passage: life6C'acken v. Hayward, 29How. 608 ; Moore v. Yowler, 1 Hemp. 536.
XIV. State Constitutions.-State constitutions are "laws" within
the meaning of the limitation : Bailroadv.McClure, 10 Wall. 511;
Lehigh Valley Ed. Co. v. Afe ar[an, 81 N. J. Eq. 706. But
"there is nothing in the constitution of the United States which
forbids Congress to pass laws violating the obligation of contracts,
although such a power isdenied to the states individually :" E-vans
v. -Eaton,Pet. C. C. 337.
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HAWKINS v. HAWKINS & HOPE.
A petitioner and respondent separated by mutual consentshortly after the marriago,,
and only mt once afterwards. The petitioner alloiwed her a small sum for her support, and sixteen years after tlhe marriage discovered that she had committed adul
ery: lietu, under the circumstanca, that the petitioner had conduccd to the adidtery. Petition dismissed.

Tris was a petition for the dissolution of marriage by reason of
the adultery of the wife.
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The parties were married on the 13th of Ju*Ly 1863, at St. James'
Church, Piccadilly. The petitioner had become acquainted with
the respondent (who was a shop girl) some short time previously,
and had been improperly intimate wiith her, and compelled by her
father to marry her. At the time of the marriage the petitioner
was entirely dependent upon his uncle and aunt, and it was arranged
between him and the respondent that the marriage should be kept
secret.
A few days after the marriage the parties separated and never
cohabited again, the petitioner allowing his wife from 21. to 41. a
month, which he remitted to her by letter. They met once at
Charing Cross about sixteen years after the marriage, when something was said about living together, but neither party seemed
desirous of doing so. With that exception they had not seen each
other until shortly before the institution of this suit, when the petitioner discovered that the respondent had been, for some years, living
in adultery. The petitioner's uncle died in 1870 leaving all his
property to the aunt, and she died in 1881, bequeathing a considerable fortune to the petitioner.
The respondent's adultery. was proved, and she was called as a
witness in support of her case.
Sir J. HANNEN (President).-The petitioner in this case seduced
the respondent when she was a young woman, and her father having
brought pressure upon him to marry her, the petitioner required
her to keep the marriage secret, as if it was known to'the uncle'and
aunt they would not leave him their property; but even after the
uncle's death the petitioner continued to live apart from his wtfe,
although he introduced her to his aunt as the person whom he intended to marry. Every husband is bound to give his wife that
protection which the society of a husband affords, and the fact that
the respondent had been familiar with him before marriage made
that duty more incumbent upon him, she being a person who might
be more likely to yield to temptation. Having regard, therefore,
to the petitioner's conduct in leaving his wife withoui a husband's
-protection, and being of opinion that that conduct conduced to her
adultery, I consider that he is not entitled to a dissolution of his
marriage.
Petition dismissed with costs.
Collusion and connivance, it is universally agreed, prevent a husband from

obtaining a divorce. They both are but
phases or shades of the same disposition,
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intent, desire or willingness on the part
of the husband that his wife shall commit
some act, which is by statute made a
cause of divorce. The divorce statutes
seldom, if ever, expressly declare that
such conduct of the husband shall bar
his divorcer but inasmuch as their language generally is that divorces "may
be" granted for such and such causes,
the courts practically interpret it to
mean that in some cases they may not
be, and-that in their discretion they can
and will refuse it, although the act
alleged be fully proved, if the husband
himself has been a consenting party,
though not guilty of any similar act, or
of any conduct warranting a divorce on
the wife's application.
Indeed, the law of recrimination rests
upon a similar ground. Thestatute law
does not expressly say that adultery by
the husband is an absolute bar to obtaining- a divorce from the wife for the
same cause, nor rke versa.
But the courts refuse to exercise their
power in all such cases, on the broad
ground that a party guilty of violating
the marriage bond shall not have the
assistance of the court to enforce any
marital right: Hope v. flope, I Sw. &
Tr. 107.
And connivance is a bar therefore, on
the broad general ground that consent
takes away any remedy. Vrolenti non fit
injuria.
Therefore, it was held in Pierce v.
Pierce, 3 Pick. 299 (1825), that though
the adultery-of the wife was proved, the divorce must be refused, because there was
"reason to think that the husband was
the cause of its being committed."
"It
would be," say the court, "a dangerous
principle to establish, that a husband
who had suspicions of the infidelity of
his wife, shall be allowed to -lay a train
which may lead her to the commission of
adultery, in order that he may take advantage of it to obtain a divorce. As
we are clear that the adultery proved
was committed with the knowledge and

consent of the libellant, and probably
with his connivance, a divorce will notbe granted."
Actual "connivance,"
therefore, is
always recognised as a bap to a decree.
See Cairns v. Cairns, 109 Mass. 408.
The more delicate question is what
state of mind, or will, on the part of
a, husband, not amounting to contrivance
or connivance exactly, but merely willingness, or perhaps indifference on his
part is sufficient to have the same effect.
This question arose in Morrison v. Morrisen, 136 Mass. 310 (1884>, in which
the judge who tried the cause found simply this state of facts : " The husband
did no act directly to encourage the adultery in his wife, and he did nothing to
prevent it. He went to bed-early, sometimes leaving her and another man together in the sitting room, and suspecting
that they might commit adultery, and
knowing that the detective previously
employed by him, would probably be on7
the watch to discover it ; he made no remonstrance or objection against their
being together ; he concealed his suspicions from both of them; he took no pains
to protect herfrom seduction. And from
the various circumstances," said the
judge," I find. thatfrom the time when his
suspicions were first excited. he was in
his own mind willing that she should
commit adultery, provided he could thereby obtain a divorce; and he expected
that she would commit adultery, and that
he should obtain proof of it, and thus
be enabled to procure a divorce." And
his refusal to grant a divorce was sustained by theL full court, on his report
whether his decision was right. The
court say that this was sufficient to
warrant the finding of connivance,
whether they should or should not have
drawn the same inference from the existing facts. If there was any mistake
here, it was in drawing too unfavorable
a conclusion against the hnshbnnd from
the factq actually proved. The prcsiding judge does not exactly say, on his
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report, that he found the actual fact of a
"cconnivance," although the court above
seem to have so considered it.
Mr. Bishop, in his valuable book on
Marriage and Divorce, thus states the
law on this point:
"The law requires the husband to
watch over the morals of his wife; and
protect her against associations which
might expose to hazard her purity, or
by lowering her standard of virtue, prepare the way for the approaches of the
seducer. Hence, while his want of attention to her selection of associates, to
her morals, and to her conduct in other
respects, is not of itself connivance, it
may be strong, sometimes satisfactory
evidence of it :" 2 Mar. and Div., sect.
17. Elsewhere he says, that though
connivance may be passive as well as
active, yet there must be a complete
consent on his part; and there can be
no connivance without such consent, active or passive ; and as the law does not
take cognisance of thought merely, there
must be some act, word, or omission of
duty blending with a passive willingness
And
to have the wrong committed.
that a real intention to have the wife
transgress; or at least an intention to
allow her to do so undisturbed and unprevented, must exist in order to amount
to connivance, very distinctly appears
from the important cases of Pihiips v.
Phillips, 3 Notes of Cases 444; 4 Id.
524; Moorsom v.Mloorsom, 3 Hagg. 105 ;
Hoar v. Hoar, Id. 137 ; Hges v. Hoges, Id. 123.
Elsewhere, however, it is said, that
"willing acquiescence in the continuation of an adulterous intercourse by the
other party is sufficient." See Bodting
v. Boulting, 3 Sw. & Tr. 335 (1864).
. The necessity of corrupt intention to
constitute connivance, was also distinctly
held by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the very recent case of Robbins
v. Robbins, yet unreported. The evideuce there clearly showed a scheme to
detect the libellee in adultery if she was

guilty, but no corrupt intent that adultery should be committed, nor any con"sent to it, or connivance at it. And it
was held that the husband was entitled
to his divorce.
But whatever may be the law of connivance, or from whatever acts that fact
may be considered as sufficiently proved,
it is obvious that the principal case goes
a step further-and a very important
step further-in the law of divorce. It
is not claimed that the husband in any
way consented, assented, or desired the
adultery of his wife, or knew of its
probability, or that she was actually exposed to any danger. The whole averment simply is, that by separating from
her, by mutual consent, he thereby,
although continuing to support her,
exposed her to danger, and therefore
"conduced "to the violation of her marriage vow. If this be legal cause for refusing a divorce, few divorces would be
granted. It is comparatively seldom
there is not some fault, or neglect, to
be found on the part of the husband, ere
a wife will be guilty of such misconduct.
And if such acts, merely as inattention,
neglect, and the like, establish " conducement," and so bar him from divorce for
her adultery, it can be but regarded as
establishing a very important principle
in this branch of the law.
Perhaps the strnogest case in our
American courts looking to such a conclusion is that of Barberv. Barber, 14 Law
Rep. 375 (1851) in the Superior Court
of Connecticut. The libel by the busband wason the ground of '"habitual
intemperance."
The defence was that
the wife, being sick and nervous, acquired the habit of taking large quantitics of morphine, which th6 husband procured for her, with the advice of her
physician: and that subsequently, in
order to wean her from its use, she, with
his advice, began to take large quantities of gin, which he procured for her.
This was held to prevent him from ohtamining his divorce, although the judge

